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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Case No: 20140967-CA

WILLIAM TIRADO,
Defendant / Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

****
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Whether trial counsel committed ineffective assistance of counsel by laboring
under an actual conflict of interest which adversely affected counsel's perfonnance.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed
for correctness. State v. Vos, 2007 UT App 215,, 9, 164 P.3d 1258.

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
William Tirado appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of the
Honorable Ernie W. Jones, Second District Court, from a conviction of Arranging the
Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony, and Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, after he was convicted by a jury.

B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
On August 1, 2012, the State charged Tirado with Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a C_lass A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code §58-3 7a-5( 1). R.001.
A separate count of Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code §58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), was subsequently added by amended
infonnation filed in October, 2013. R.031. A preliminary hearing was held on December
4, 2013 and Tirado was bound over for trial upon a finding of probable cause. R.043-46.
On May 12, 2014, the case was tried to a jury who found Tirado guilty on both
counts of the information. R.078-84.
Tirado was sentenced October 15, 2014 to statutory tenns in the Utah State Prison.
R.172; 218. The judgment was entered on October 20, 2014. R.174.
On October 21, 2014, Tirado filed a notice of appeal in Second District Court.
Q

R.176.
Samuel Newton was initially assigned as appellate counsel for Tirado, and on May
27, 2015 Newton filed a brief and a motion to remand based on Rule 23B. However, in
June a Stipulated Motion for Temporary Remand to Address Potential Conflict of Interest

2

Q

was filed and granted. In that motion Samuel Ne-wton disclosed that he had a conflict of
interest based on his representation of both Tirado and Carl Courtney. On remand the
district court concluded that a conflict existed and assigned current appellate counsel to
represent Tirado.
After having reviewed the case and consulting with Tirado, current appellate
counsel moved to strike the brief and 23B motion filed by Samuel Newton. That motion
was granted by this Court. Tirado now simultaneously files this brief and a Rule 23B
motion for remand.

NOTE REGARDING CITATIONS
Because this brief is filed consistent with this Court's Order Pertaining to Rule
23B, many of the factual assertions in this brief will be cited from the Attachments to
Tirado's simultaneously-filed Rule 23B Motion to Remand, rather than being cited
directly to the record. Tirado anticipates supplementing this brief in the event that this
Court grants his motion for remand and further evidence is placed on the record.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Jason Vanderwarf, a police officer working with the Multijurisdictional
Counterdrug Task Force, testified that on July 26, 2012, he had an informant named
Lorenzo Gomez who contacted him and said that he had agreed with the defendant,
William Tirado, to purchase two eight balls ofmethamphetamine for $440. R.217:11012. An eight ball was approximately 3.5 grams, so around 7 grams total. R.217:111. The
eight ball would have at least 20 individual uses in it. R.217: 186-87.

3

Gomez knew Tirado previously and knew his voice. R.217: 170-71. Gomez and
Tirado talked privately and agreed to the deal before Gomez decided to take it to the
1

police. R.217: 171-73 . Vanderwarf decided to set up a sting operation to apprehend the
dealer. ~.217:112. Gomez, the State's confidential informant, was a convicted felon who
was getting paid anywhere from $50 to $200 to create drug deals for the police.
R.217: 15 5-56, 170. He had his own drug charges to work off and was an admitted drug
addict who was still using at the time of this event. R.217:180, 185.
The officer drove by Tirado's house and witnessed him standing out in front with
·Carl Courtney, whom the officer "had prior dealings with" for drug offenses. R.217:112.
V anderwarf, Gomez and another police officer, Cox, parked around the comer from the
home, right by the library, and made a phone call. R.217:113, 173. Vanderwarfhad a
recording device that he used to record the phone call as it was on speaker phone.
R.217:113.
Gomez made the phone call to 801-686-6567 and Tirado answered. R.217: 114. 2
Gomez said the caller was Tirado. R.217: 173. Vanderwarf said he recognized the caller
as Tirado from previous dealings two years earlier and his subsequent conversation with

Q
1

Neither Gomez nor Vanderwarf mentioned this phone call in the preliminary hearing.
Indeed, Vanderwarf seemed to imply that it was Gomez's first recorded call where the
agreement to purchase two eight-balls took place. R.216:23-24.
2
Vanderwarftestified that Tirado gave 801-686-6567 as his contact number when he was
booked into jail and his address as 653 25 th Street (about a half a block away from the
comer). R.217:136-37; State's Ex. 8.
4

Q

him while he was in custody. R.217:114, 149-50. 3 Gomez asked Tirado if "he had it" and
then confirmed "four-four-zero." R.217:114, 174.
There was no specific mention of drugs on any of the phone calls. Gomez said the
$440 referred to a quarter ounce of methamphetamine. R.217: 17 5-76. The officer also
testified he knew this was a drug transaction from the language used: Gomez's prior
(unrecorded) call where eight balls were mentioned, the "do you got it" phrase, "fourfour-zero" and "they just left," which the officer testified were part of "their own little
language" which he said ''is, without a doubt," the language of "a drug transaction."
R.217: 151-54. Gomez said the call involved where they should meet and if he had money
on him, but he added that when he asked if he had it, he meant "if he had the dope, if he
had it on him." R.217:174, 184.
Gomez then made a second call that was played for the jury. 4 In that call, Gomez
told Tirado to meet him across from the library-this was because the officers did not
want Gomez to cross the street "for his safety and officer safety." R.217:145, 175.
Officers then searched Gomez, gave him cash and fitted him with a bug. R.217:116, 174.
Gomez then walked toward 25 th Street and Jefferson, 490 feet from a Baptist church.
R.217: 116-17, 124. Vanderwarf and Officer Sean Grogan watched Tirado walking

3

No parties self-identified on the tape. R.217: 150.
Vanderwarf earlier testified that only one phone call was made and that no subsequent
phone calls occurred, but later changed that story. R.217: 116.
4

5

toward the corner. R.217:117, 191. 5 They could also see Gomez standing on the comer.
R.21 7: 123, 191.
Gomez asked Tirado to come over across the street. R.217: 145, 177. Gomez asked
him if he "got it" and said that his friend was going to pick him up and he had to hurry
"and get this or he's going to say Fit." R.217: 178. Tirado asked Gomez ifhe had the
money on him and Gomez said that he did. R.217: 178. But Tirado told Gomez that he did
not have it because "his dude left." R.217: 183. Vanderwarf could hear Tirado (over the

G

recording) say "my friend's already left" or "they've already left" or "my dude just left"
and the two bantering. R.217: 123, 178. Because agents told Gomez he could not cross the
street, neither person crossed-"they both held at their corners." R.217: 124. As one
officer put it, Gomez "was on the north side of the road, the defendant was on the south
side of the road, and they were mostly conversing back and forth across the street, mostly
trying to get one another to cross the street to meet." R.217: 191. Gomez ended up just
walking away. R.217: 124, 177-78. No actual drug transaction took place and the two
never met. R.217:163.
Vanderwarf decided to take Tirado and Carl Courtney into custody. R.217: 125,
128. Vanderwarftestified "I had active charges [on Courtney] and was actually looking
for him that I had for distribution of narcotics." R.217:128.
Officers found no drugs or paraphernalia on Tirado. R.217: 151, 154-55. While
Tirado was in custody, officers obtained Courtnee Reynolds' (Tirado's fiance)

5

Gomez testified inconsistently at the preliminary hearing that Tirado was already there
when he arrived. R.216: 15.
6

~

permission to search their home. R.217: 129-3 5, 191, 194-96. They did not locate any
drugs in the search. R.217:167, 196. But they were able to locate items of paraphernalia,
including some pipes, baggies and some scales, which the officers b~lieved could have
been used for distribution purposes. R.217:129-35, 160,168, 191-92. Vanderwarf
interviewed Tirado about these items and he "admitted that it was all his"-"that he was
a meth user." R.217: 129. He said he used "enough to get by." R.217: 130. Vanderwarf did
not book Tirado for arranging a drug deal, but for possession of drug paraphernalia,
which he said they delayed screening to protect their informant. R.217:157-58. 6
Carl Courtney possessed of2.1 grams of methamphetamine, well shy of the 7
grams needed for the deal. R.217: 142, 160, 164, 198. 7 Vanderwarf also interviewed
Courtney, who said that "ifhe needed to sell [the methamphetamine], he would sell from
that specific amount." R.217:138. The drugs located on Courtney were found with other
"separate empty baggies" which the officer opined could be used for redistribution and
repackaging. R.217: 142, 199. Officer Jensen testified the amount on Carl Courtney was
a "user's amount", depending upon the user. R.217:201.
Vandenvarf had previously bought drugs from Courtney himself and testified that
"from my knowledge of Carl Courtney, he deals directly to his people" and did not use a

6

Defense counsel pointed out at trial that Tirado was not charged for a year and a half
until after the State convicted Courtney of his crime, insinuating that somehow the charge
was not believed to be sustainable at the time. R.217 :260-61.
7
One officer testified that it was 1.75 grams, which was "typically a user's amount."
R.217:200-01.
7

middleman. R.217:165. 8 He admitted a "possible theory" was that Courtney used Tirado
as a middleman to arrange the deal. R.217: 166. Gomez believed as much, saying that
based on his prior interactions with Tirado he obtained his drugs from Carl Courtney.
R.217:179. But Gomez said all but one time he purchased drugs from Tirado directly.
R.217: 181-82.

Even though Tirado was not in possession of drugs and the amount found on
Courtney was not consistent with what the State contended was the arranged deal, the
State argued that Tirado acted as a middleman. When questioned about charging Tirado
with arranging to distribute when no drugs were found on Tirado, Vanderwarf responded:
"But for the arrangement there doesn't have to be drugs found. All that is-all it requires
is the act of the arrangement for the distribution of narcotics. This is a case wherein
which Mr. Tirado, using a middleman, Carl Courtney, to possibly get the money first, go
meet with Carl Courtney." R.217:163-64.
Middlemen don't always have the drug, because they guarantee whether the
person has money and they act as lookouts. R.217: 146. There could be other scouts
present to make sure the scene is clear and no police are around. R.217: 147. Vanderwarf
explained the different quantities as a fear of robbery from the dealer's end. R.217: 147.
They may want to make sure the person has money and then take them to a new
location-to "clear their tail" and make sure no one is following them. R.217:148.
Sometimes they intend to rob a person as well and not give them any drugs. R.217: 149.

8

Though the officer later retracted that and said that Courtney had used middle men as
well. R.217: 166-67.
8

Q

Tirado presented testimony from his fiance, Courtney Reynolds, who said that she
told the officers they could not come into the house, but that they "pushed the door open
and followed us back in." R.217:210-13. She said they searched the room without a
search warrant. R.217 :213. The State called Officer Derek Draper in rebuttal, who said
that they asked Reynolds for permission to enter and to search and that she gave it to
them. R.217:218-19.
-·.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Tirado' s attorney, Sean Young, also represented Carl Courtney, who was in reality
Tirado' s codefendant. Carl Courtney, although not charged as a codefendant in the case,
was arrested at the scene with Tirado, was discovered to have methamphetamine on his
person, was charged and convicted based on the same evidence presented in this case,
and his statements were admitted against Tirado. Tirado's trial counsel had a duty to
discovery and present a defense, to cross examine the witnesses against Tirado, and to
direct blame away from Tirado on to codefendants. Because counsel also had a duty to
Carl Courtney to avoid self-incrimination, a duty of confidentiality, a duty of loyalty,
Sean Young had a conflict of interest. Because counsel failed to call Carl Courtney as a
witness or confront his statements admitted against Tirado that conflict affected counsel's
performance. This is an actual conflict of interest and constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel.

9

ARGUMENT

I. TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
BY OPERATING UNDER AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
A. Relevant Law
Statutes and Rules

Several of the Utah Rules of Professional Responsibility are implicated in this
appeal. The first and most basic rule governing an attorney's obligation to his client is
Rule 1.1 Competence. "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.

preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." The comments to this rule give
some insight into how "thoroughness and preparation" can be measured.
"Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the
factual and legal elements of the problem and use of methods and procedures
meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate
preparation."
Put simply, in a criminal case an attorney must be adequately prepared to confront the
evidence presented against his client. That also mean knowing the who the codefendants
and witnesses will be.
Another relevant rule is Rule 1.6 Confidentiality oflnformation. "A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent. .. " except in several enumerated circumstances. Thus an attorney's
disclosure of any information about his client, without infonned consent is generally
prohibited. This is especially true regarding information that could potentially be adverse

10
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to the client's interests or reputation. This rule is tied directly to a lawyer's duty of
loyalty. When a lawyer learns information about his client, his duty is to keep that
infonnation confidential, to keep his mouth shut about anything that has to do with his
client unless disclosure is authorized by the client or is part of the representation.
Rule 1. 7 Conflict of Interest: Concurrent Clients says
"a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (a)( 1) The
representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (a)(2)
There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client~ a former client
or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer."
The comments to this rule instruct an attorney who discovers a potential conflict of
interest to
_"1) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) detennine whether a conflict of interest
exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the
existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and, 4) if so ...
obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing."
Rule 1. 7 Comment 2. Lawyers should adopt reasonable procedures to determine whether
a conflict of interest exists. In criminal law reasonable procedures include reviewing the
evidence to see whether multiple people are implicated, or if witnesses may be called,
and if so, whether the lawyer's duties to others may impact the lawyer's duties to the
defendant. When unforeseeable developments arise creating a conflict of interest "the
lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid
the conflict." Rule 1. 7 Comment 3.

11

"Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a
significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an
appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of
the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests." In some instances, a lawyer
representing multiple parties may be "materially limited in the lawyer's ability to
recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the
lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives
that would otherwise be available to the client."
Rule 1. 7 Comment 8.

criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more
than one codefendant." Comment 23. "A conflict of interest exists ... if there is a
significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit
the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case ... If
there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the
affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw
from one or both matters."
Rule 1.7 Comment 24.
"As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost
certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other
client infonnation relevant to the common representation. This is so because the
lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to
be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that
client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to
that client's benefit."
Rule Comment 31.
Rule 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules says:

12

"[a] lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the
disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as
permitted or required by these Rules."
The comments expand the rule.
"Use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client
violates the lawyer's duty ofloyalty. Paragraph (b) applies when the information
is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client or
business associate of the lawyer."
Rule 1.8 Comment 5.
These rules can be combined to say that lawyers should be cautious when
undertaking the representation of a new client because the lawyer's duties include the
duty not to represent multiple clients with conflicting interests. This is especially true in a
criminal case where the lawyer is faced with the potential of representing two defendants
who have been charged with crimes arising from the same evidence. This is compounded
even further in cases where one of the clients has provided a statement implicating the
other client because the duty to protect one client at the expense is so readily apparent no
matter which client the lawyer chooses to protect.

Cases on Actual Conflicts of Interests
According to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) "[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of
counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." "Representation of a criminal defendant entails

13

certain basic duties" including "a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest."
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 688.
Generally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has two components; "[f]irst,
the defendant must show that the performance was deficient", and, "[ s]econd, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687. However, in some contexts, prejudice is presumed. One such instance
is "when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest" because "[i]n those
circumstances~ counsel breaches the duty of loyalty ... " Strickland: at 692. The ha.rm less
error rule (or the requirement of demonstrating prejudice) is not necessary because "in
the case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil. .. is in what the advocate
finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible
pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process ... Thus, an inquiry into a claim of
harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation." Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 4 75, 490, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 ( 1978). In these cases,
prejudice is presumed "if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented
conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance."' Strickland, at 692 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348,
350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)).
"An actual conflict of interest results if counsel was forced to make choices

advancing other interests to the detriment of his client." United States v. Alvarez, 137
F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998). In Alvarez the defendant claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel based on an actual conflict of interest where he claimed his retained
14
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attorney had been hired and paid by his codefendants and that "his counsel was not
working on his behalf, but on behalf of codefendant ... '' Alvarez, 137 F.3d 1249, 1251.
The Tenth Circuit considered the "two-part test" governing the claim, that "the
client must demonstrate [ 1] an actual conflict of interest [2] which adversely affected his
lawyer's performance." Alvarez, at 1251 (rejecting the governments contention that a
defendant must also show prejudice). The Court noted that "possible conflicts" are
common in multiple representation but an actual conflict "results if counsel was forced to
make choices advancing other interests to the detriment of his client." Id. '~Indeed, 'to
demonstrate an actual conflict of interest, the petitioner must be able to point to specific
instances in the record which suggest an impairment or compromise of his interests for
the benefit of another party."' Id. (citing Danner v. United States, 820 F.2d 1166, 1170
(11th Cir. 1987)).
The Court carefully reviewed the record but could not find anything to "suggest a
divergence of interests between [the defendant] and his codefendants or a compromise of
any kind in counsel's defense ... " Id. Because the defendant could not demonstrate an
adverse affect, the fact that a possible conflict could not support his ineffective assistance
claim.
The same issue was considered in State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, 984 P.2d 382 (cert

denied 528 U.S. 1083, 120 S.Ct. 806, 145 L.Ed.2d 679 (2000)). There the defendant,
who pled guilty after confessing to murder, argued "his trial counsel had extensive
personal associations with prosecutor Reed Richards and that the relationship denied
Lovell his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel." Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ~22. Lovell
15

showed that his attorney and the prosecutor had "a lengthy personal and professional
relationship" that included jointly owned real estate, help with tax returns, political
campaigning, former law partnership, and an alleged access to each other's files.
However, because the defendant failed to establish that his attorney's ties to the
prosecutor forced him to make any choice that advanced his interests to the detriment of
the defendant failed to meet his burden.
"Determining whether any conflict adversely affected [counsel's] performance
turns on whether ( 1) other counsel likely would have approached the case differently and
(2) a tactical reason other than the alleged conflict existed for [counsel's] decisions."
Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ,I24. There, because of the strength of the State's case "it was in

Lovell's best interest to work toward a plea bargain, and it is not apparent that other
counsel could have or would have approached the case differently."
Of course, an attorney is not obligated to pursue a defense strategy just because it is
a defendant's preference. "If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot
create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade."
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984).

"Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to
prevent the attorney from doing ... Generally speaking, a conflict may also prevent an
attorney from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but perhaps
favorable to another. .. " Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55
L.Ed.2 426 (1978). Or for that matter, it may prevent an attorney from presenting
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evidence prejudicial to one client and favorable to another, especially when the evidence
may betray the attorney-client privilege.
An example of this problem is demonstrated in Hammond v. Ward, 466 F.3d 919
(10th Cir. 2009). There a single attorney represented two codefendant brothers. Prior to
trial the two had planned to work together and the trial strategy involved one brother
"would take the full rap for the gun found in the vehicle, [and] both men would disavow
knowledge that there were drugs in the car". Hammond, 466 F.3d 919, 930. However,
sometime prior to trial the government offered the brother a favorable plea agreement but
only if he agreed to inculpate the defendant. Even though the brother did not actually
testify against the defendant "counsel's performance was adversely affected by an actual
conflict in this case ... because trial counsel could not simultaneously negotiate the most
favorable deal for [brother] ... without both disqualifying [brother] from providing
exculpatory testimony for [defendant] and, consequently, sabotaging [defendant's] most
viable defense strategy ... " Hammond, at 930.
When brother got an opportunity to obtain a favorable conditional plea his interest
"conflicted with [defendant's] interest in presenting his best defense. And when trial
counsel continued to represent the defendant through trial, without brother's exculpatory
testimony, he did so "without the best witness ... to create a reasonable doubt in the
State's case." Id. See also United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1500 (10th Cir. 1990)
("[D]efense counsel's performance [is] adversely affected by an actual conflict of interest
if a specific and seemingly valid or genuine alternative strategy or tactic was available to
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defense counsel, but it was inherently in conflict with his duties to others or to his own
personal interests.").
Another relevant example can be found in United States v. Gallegos, 108 F.3d 1272
(10th Cir. 1997). There the defendant argued he was denied effective assistance of
counsel where his codefendant, who was represented by the same attorney, entered a
plea. On the morning of trial, when the codefendant was to be called as a witness it came
to light that he planned to 'take the fifth' in order to avoid any additional charges.
Counsel then raised his concern. "mv lovalties tor codefendantl has to be to sav vou need
,i
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to take the Fifth Amendment. My loyalties to my client, [defendant], is that he should
testify. I see no way to rectify that decision ... " Gallegos, 108 F.3d 1272, 1282. The trial
court did not sever the defendant's case, did not appoint separate counsel, and did not
secure a waiver of the conflict.
The Tenth Circuit applied the Holloway rule and found "there was indeed a
material conflict of interest" and that trial counsel:
"was in a very precarious situation. Because [codefendant] possessed information
that was exculpatory to (defendant], [counsel's] duty to [defendant] was to
encourage [codefendant] to testify and to attempt to elicit this exculpatory
information from him. On the other hand, [counsel'sJ obligation to [codefendant]
was to discourage him from testifying. If [codefendant] had testified, he would
have subjected himself to the risk of additional criminal charges. Thus, there was a
real conflict of interest present, and the trial court erred in failing to either obtain a
waiver from [defendant] or take adequate steps to protect [defendant's] right to
conflict-free representation."

Gallegos, I 08 F.3d at 1283. The Court distinguished the defendant's case from an
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'•inapposite~' case where a conflict of interest never actually materialized. See United

States v. McCullah, 76 F .3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996). Unlike that case, the attorney in
Gallegos "was placed in a position of representing interests of a ... witness directly
adverse to those of his client." Gallegos, at 1283 (citing United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d
388, 394 (10th Cir. 1995)).
Typical actual conflict of interest cases involve multiple representation of
codefendants but "a defendant's right to counsel free from conflicts of interest is not
limited to cases involving joint representation of co-defendants but extends to any
situation in which a defendant's counsel owes conflicting duties to that defendant and
some other third person." United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 393 (10th Cir. 1995).

B. Application to the facts
Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for laboring under an actual
conflict of interest that affected his performance and decision making
According to the record, Sean Young was assigned as Tirade's attorney on August
8, 2012. R.007. According to the affidavits and documents attached to Tirade's Rule 23B
Motion, Sean Young represented Carl Courtney as the appointed public defender. See
Attachment C, D, E, F. If Sean Young was appointed at or near the beginning of Carl
Courtney's case that would have been in August of 2012, around the same time he was
assigned to represent Tirado. That means that Sean Young was acting as appointed
counsel for both Tirado and Carl Courtney long before Courtney entered his plea in
November of 2013, and long before Tirado went to trial in May of 2014. It means he
represented both men in December of 2013 when the State presented evidence and
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argument at Tirado's preliminary hearing that the drugs found on Carl Courtney could be
attributed to Tirado because drug deals often involve more than one person and Tirado
has been known to get his drugs from Carl Courtney in the past. R.216:26-31.
As noted above, a concurrent conflict of interest arises when "[t]here is a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client. .. " UT R PRO RESP, RULE 1. 7. As noted in
the comments to the rule, even where there is no direct adverseness "a lawyer
representing multiple parties may be 'materially limited in the lawyer's ability to
recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the
lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that
would otherwise be available to the client."' Rule I. 7, comment 8. Thus, as the cases
proceeded, Carl Courtney's to a plea agreement and Tirado's to a jury trial, these two
defendants were "concurrent clients."
The question becomes whether or not Sean Young's duty of loyalty to Carl
Courtney infringed upon his duty of loyalty to Tirado at any relevant time, or vice versa,
and therefore limited counsel's ability to take possible positions that could be
advantageous to either client. Tirado asserts that counsel's representation of Carl
Courtney prevented Sean Young from being able to prepare a defense by investigating
r'>
\;J.;,

and calling Carl Courtney as a witness and it prevented him from confronting the
statements offered by the State attributed to Carl Courtney and impeaching his
credibility. Sean Young was prevented from doing these things because to do so would
have violated his duties of loyalty and confidentiality to Carl Courtney, pitting Carl

20

G

Courtney's interests against Tirado' s. Tirado had the right to be informed about anything
Sean Young knew relevant to his defense, and he had the right to expect his lawyer
would use any available information, evidence, witness to his benefit. Unfortunately, due
to the conflict of interest, Tirado' s right to counsel was infringed when it butted up
against Sean Young's duties to Carl Courtney. See Rule 1.7, comment 31. 9
At trial the State presented evidence of Carl Courtney's crime, his statements, his
criminal history. This evidence was admitted without objection or challenge from the
defense. And this evidence was used by the State to bolster the otherwise unsupported
claims of the paid confidential informant, Lorenzo Gomez. The police said Gomez came
to them after allegedly speaking to Tirado about a drug deal involving two "eight-balls".
However, when the police got involved the discussions they overheard and recorded
between Tirado and Gomez never discuss any specifics. Neither Tirado nor Gomez
mentioned drugs, or meth, or any other language the officers could translate as meaning
methamphetamine. And there is no explicit discussion about any kind of exchange.
Instead there was discussion about whether Tirado had "it" and Tirado used the phase
"four-four-zero". As explained above, Gomez never met with Tirado, no exchange ever
occurred, and when the police arrested and searched Tirado and his home, no evidence of
his having possession of methamphetamine was ever discovered.

9

"As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost
certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client
information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an
equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of
anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the
right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit."
21

So what the State was left with was the word of a paid informant and two audio
recordings that do not disclose any incriminating statements or evidence. That is why the
evidence related to Carl Courtney was so important to the State, and confronting it was so
important to Tirado. This imp011ance is at the heart of why Sean Young should not have
represented these t\vo codefendants.
A "legal conflict of interest generally refers to an incompatibility between the
interests of two of a lawyer's clients ... " State v. Graham, 2012 UT App 332,128,291
P.3d 243 (intern.al citation omitted). The incompatibility between the interests of Tirado
and his defense, and the interests of Carl Courtney and his confidential relationship with
Sean Young created a "legal conflict of interest." Tirado's interest was to demonstrate
that he had nothing to do with the drugs found in Carl Courtney's pocket, to separate
himself from Carl Courtney's statement that he could sell those drugs, from Carl
Courtney's history and reputation for selling drugs. It was in Tirado's interest to impeach
and criticize Carl Courtney in any way that would distance himself from Carl Courtney in
order to challenge the State's argument that Tirado was acting as his middleman.
On the other hand, Carl Courtney was defending himself against this and other
cases filed in th~ same court. See Attachment C (" .. .I was also defending myself in
several other cases. Sean Young was also appointed to represent me in those cases.). Carl
Courtney had an interest in negotiating possible favorable outcomes in those case, in
seeking favorable sentencing recommendations from the prosecution. He also had an
interest in keeping secret any potentially incriminating evidence he may have told Sean
Young in confidence.
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Because these interests were incompatible, Sean Young faced what the Court in

Graham calls a '"legal conflict of interest. .. ". He was forced to choose to compromise
Tirado' s interests in challenging the State's evidence and presenting a defense, or to
compromise Carl Courtney's interest in keeping his confidential communications private,
in maintaining the lawyer/client relationship and loyalty, and in keeping in the good
graces of the State. To Tirado's detriment, Sean Young chose to run the risk that the jury
would not tie the Carl Courtney evidence with Tirado. That choice should not have to
have been made, a lawyer should not have to be forced to make a compromise between
two clients. Tirado deserved Sean Young's undivided loyalty.
This compromise adversely affected Sean Young's performance. It prevented him
from wholeheartedly representing Tirado. The manifestation of this misrepresentation
played out at trial when Carl Courtney was not called to testify as a defense witness to
say that the drugs in his pocket had nothing to do with Tirado' s phone conversation with
Gomez. See Attachment C. It was manifest when Carl Courtney's statements were
admitted without objection in violation of Tirado~ s right to confront the witnesses against
him.
Tirado predicts that the State's response to this claim will focus on the quantity and
quality of the other evidence presented to prove Tirado committed the act of arranging to
distribute. This Court should recognize that such a response misses the point of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on an actual conflict. As the cases make
clear, Tirado is not required to show that the conflict actually prejudiced him, in other
words he is not required to show that but for the conflict of interest he would have been
23

acquitted. The presumption of prejudice means that Tirado only has to show that the
actual conflict adversely affected his attorneys' performance, and being prevented from
calling a witness with evidence that could legitimately rebut the elements of the case is
sufficient. Showing that the actual conflict prevent counsel from asserting Tirado's right
to confront the witnesses against him is sufficient.
Because Sean Young's concurrent representation of Carl Courtney prevented
Tirado from presenting a witness who could interfere with the State's argument tying
Tirado to the drugs in Carl Courtney's pocket, which was consistent with the overall
defense strategy, the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's performance.
Because Sean Young's representation of Carl Courtney prevented Tirado from
confronting and impeaching the witness who the State used to establish that the drugs
were possessed for distribution, the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's
performance. This actual conflict of interest denied Tirado his Sixth Amendment right to
effective and conflict-free assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because Tirado' s right to effective assistance of counsel was denied, he asks this
Court to reverse his conviction and remand the case to the District Court for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day ofNovember, 2015.

Dougfa~mpson
Appointed Conflict Appellate Counsel
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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ADDENDA
Utah Rules of Professional Responsibility, Rule 1.6- Confidentiality of Information
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Clients
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Utah Rules of Prof'I Conduct Rule 1.6
Current through rules effective as of November 1, 2015.

Utah Court Rules > UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION > PART II. SUPREME
COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE > CHAPTER 13. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT > CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP

Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information
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(a)

A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b ).

(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial

injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or
is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is

reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
in which the client was involved, orto respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client;
(6) to comply with other law or a court order; or

(7) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer's change of employment or from
changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would not
compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.
(c)

A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or
unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client.

(d)

For purposes of this rule, representation of a client includes counseling a lawyer about the need for or
availability of treatment for substance abuse or psychological or emotional problems by members of the
Utah State Bar serving on a Utah State Bar endorsed lawyer assistance program.

History
Amended effective October 10, 1990; November 1, 1998; November 1, 2005; May 1, 2015
Annotations

Notes
[1 l This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the representaticn of a client during the
·lawyer's representation of the client. See Rule 1.18 for the lawyer's duties with respect to information provided to
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the lawyer by a prospective client, Rule 1.9(c)(2) for the lawyer's duty not to reveal information relating to the
lawyer's prior representation of a former client and Rules 1.B(b) and 1.9(c)(1) for the lawyer's duties with respect
to the use of such information to the disadvantage of clients and former clients.
[2] A fundamental pr;nciple in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent,
the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the repr~sentation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed
consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby
encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing
or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if
necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers
in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and
correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.
[3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related bodies of law: the attorney-client
privilege, the work product doctrine and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may
be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer
confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion
of law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client
but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such
information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope.
[4] Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of a client. This
prohibition also applies to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could
reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person. A lawyer's use of a hypothetical to discuss
issues relating to the representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will
be able to ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved.
Authorized Disclosure
[5] Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority, a lawyer is
impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation. In
some situations, for example, a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that cannot properly be disputed
or to make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter. Lawyers in a firm may, in the course
of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has
instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers.

w

Disclosure Adverse to Client
[6] Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the
confidentiality of information relating to the representation of their clients, the confidentiality rule is subject to
limited exceptions. Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits
disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. Such harm is
reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a
person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat. Thus,
a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a town•s water supply may reveal this
information to the authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will
contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer•s disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or
reduce the number of victims.
[7] Paragraph (b )(2) is a limited exception to the rule of confidentiality that permits the lawyer to reveal information
to the extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities to prevent the client from committing
a crime or fraud, as defined in Rule 1.0(d), that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
or property interests of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services.
Such a serious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship by the client forfeits the protection of this Rule. The client
can. of course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct. Although paragraph (b)(2) does
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not require the lawyer to reveal the client's misconduct, the lawyer may not counsel or assist the client in conduct
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). See also Rule 1.16 with respect to the lawyer's
obligation or right to withdraw from the representation of the client in such circumstances, and Rule 1.13(c) which
permits the lawyer, where the client is an organization, to reveal information relating to the representation in limited
circumstances.
[8] Paragraph (b )(3) addresses the situation in which the lawyer does not learn of the client's crime or fraud until
after it has been consummated. Although the client no longer has the option of preventing disclosure by refraining
from the wrongful conduct, there will be situations in which the loss suffered by the affected person can be
prevented, rectified or mitigated. In such situations, the lawyer may disclose information relating to the
representation to the extent necessary to enable the affected persons to prevent or mitigate reasonably certain
losses or to attempt to recoup their losses. Paragraph (b )(3) does not apply when a person who has committed a
crime or fraud thereafter employs a lawyer for representation concerning that offense.
[9] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the
lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these Rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure
such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure
is not impliedly authorized, paragraph (b)(4) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's
compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
[1 O] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other
misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the
conduct or representation of a former client. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal, disciplinary or other
proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong
alleged by a third person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting
together.
The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b)(5) does
not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that
the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right
to defend also applies, of course, where a proceeding has been commenced.
[11] A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b )( 5) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect
it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it
to the detriment of the fiduciary.
[12] Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information about a client. Whether such a law supersedes Rule
1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. When disclosure of information relating to the
representation appears to be required by other law, the lawyer must discuss the matter with the client to the extent
required by Rule 1.4. If, however, the other law supersedes this Rule and requires disclosure, paragraph (b )(6)
permits the lawyer to make such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.
Detection of Conflicts of Interest
[13] Paragraph (b)(7) recognizes that lawyers in different firms may need to disclose limited information to each
other to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, such as when a lawyer is considering an association with another
firm, two or more firms are considering a merger, or a lawyer is considering the purchase of a law practice. See
Rule 1.17. Comment [7]. Under these circumstances, lawyers and law firms are permitted to disclose limited
information, but only once substantive discussions regarding the new relationship have occurred. Any such
disclosure should ordinarily include no more than the identity of the persons and entities involved in a matter, a
brief summary of the general issues involved, and information about whether the matter has terminated. Even this
limited information, however, should be disclosed only to the extent reasonably necessary to detect and resolve
conflicts of interest that might arise from the possible new relationship. Moreover, the disclosure of any information
is prohibited if it would compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client (e.g., the fact that
a corporate client is seeking advice on a corporate takeover that has not been publicly announced; that a person
has consulted a lawyer about the possibility of divorce before the person's intentions are known to the person's
spouse; or that a person has consulted a lawyer about a criminal investigation that has not led to a public charge).
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Under those circumstances, paragraph (a) prohibits disclosure unless the client or former client gives informed
consent. A lawyer's fiduciary duty to the lawyer's firm may also govern a lawyer's conduct when exploring an
association with another firm and is beyond the scope of these Rules.
[14] Any information disclosed pursuant to paragraph (b)(7) may be used or further disclosed only to the extent
necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interest. Paragraph (b )(7) does not restrict the use of information
acquired by means independent to any disclosure pursuant to paragraph (b )(7). Paragraph (b )(7) also does not
affect the disclosure of information within a law firm when the disclosure is otherwise authorized, see Comment [5],
such as when a lawyer in a firm discloses information to another lawyer in the same firm to detect and resolve
conflicts of interest that could arise in connection with undertaking a new representation.
[15] A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the representation of a client by a court or by
another tribunal or governmental entity claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel the disclosure. Absent
informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous
claims that the order is not authorized by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure
by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult
with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however,
paragraph (b )(6) permits the lawyer to comply with the court's order.
[16] Paragraph {b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is
necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to
persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to
the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the
purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in
a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and
appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent
practicable.
[17] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client's representation
to accomplish the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6). In exercising the discretion conferred by
this Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with
those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may
extenuate the conduct in question. A lawyer's decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not
violate this Rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other rules. Some rules require disclosure only if such
disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2(d), 4.1 (b), 8.1 and 8.3. Rule 3.3, on the other hand,
requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this Rule. See
Rule 3.3(c).
Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality
[18] Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation
of a client against unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the
lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's
supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3. The unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure
of, information relating to the representation of a client does not constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer
has made reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure. Factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the lawyer's efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood
of disctosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty
of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer's ability to
represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use). A client may
require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent
to forgo security measures that would otherwise be required by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be required to
take additional steps to safeguard a client's information in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal
laws that govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to,
electronic information, is beyond the scope of these Rules. For a lawyer's duties when sharing information with
nonlawyers outside the lawyer's own firm, see rule 5.3. Comments [3]-[4].
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[19] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the
lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended
recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of
communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special
precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of
confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication
is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement special security
measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that
would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in order to
comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these Rules.
Former Client
[20] The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. See Rule 1.9(c)(2).
See Rule 1.9(c)(1) for the prohibition against using such information to the disadvantage of the former client.
[20a] Paragraph (d) is an addition to ABA Model Rule 1.6 and provides for confidentiality of information between
lawyers providing assistance to other lawyers under a Utah State Bar endorsed lawyer assistance program.

Amendment Notes. -The 2015 amendment added "or is using" in (b)(2); added (b)(7) and (c); redesignated former (c) as (d); and made
related and stylistic changes.

Case Notes
Applicability of privilege.
Disclosure of privileged information.
No violation.

Applicability of privilege.
Attorney could not claim attorney-client privilege regarding information in a document as to which the client had
already expressly waived the attorney-client privilege. Even if the privilege had applied, it would not protect against
the disclosure of the names of individuals and firms that had allegedly expressed interest in a business venture
because the attorney's contact with those third parties was outside the scope of any privilege. Sorenson v. Riffe,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46642 (D. Utah June 16, 2008).

Disclosure of privileged information.
Attorneys could use information they learned as insurer's in-house counsel and as attorneys for the insurer's
insureds in their lawsuit against the insurer, as long as the information disclosed was reasonably necessary to the
prosecution of their claims. Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 UT 39, 78 P.3d 603.

No violation.
Defense counsel in a criminal case did not violate the rules of professional conduct by disclosing to the trial judge
and presiding judge that they felt intimidated by their client. Defense counsel, mindful of their obligations to their
client, limited their disclosures. State v. Martinez, 2013 UT App 39, 297 P.3d 653.

Cited in
SLC Ltd. Vv. Bradford Group W., Inc., 999 F.2d 464 (10th Cir.1993); Bullockv. Carver, 910 F. Supp. 551 (D. Utah
1995).
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Confidentiality requirement of this rule includes not only statements and information obtained directly from a client,
but also other information obtained by a lawyer in the course of investigating a client's case. Utah Ethics Advisory
Op. No. 03-02 (Utah State Bar).

C
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Research References & Practice Aids
Cross-References. --

Reports to legislature by guardian ad litem as exception to this rule,§ 78A-6-902.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Broad nature of requirement.

Ethical Advisory Opinions.

Client's name, address, etc.

Information given to an attorney by his client, including the client's name, address and telephone number, is
confidential, and the attorney is prohibited from disclosing such information to securities brokers, financial
planners, insurance salesmen and other professionals, without receiving prior permission from the clients. Utah
Ethics Advisory Op. No. 97-04 (Utah St. Bar).

Q

Client's prior convictions.

Where an attorney serving as defense counsel in a criminal case is expressly requested by the court at a
sentencing hearing for information obtained from or about the defendant regarding the defendant's prior
convictions, the attorney may only answer with the client's informed consent; otherwise, the attorney must
respectfully decline to answer the court's request in a manner that will not be misleading to the court. Utah Ethics
Advisory Op. No. 05-02 (Utah St. Bar).
Communications with prospective client.

After an attorney has interviewed a prospective client, and even though the lawyer does not undertake the
representation and has not given legal advice to the prospective client, the obligation of confidentiality usually
attaches. The circumstances when the attorney may breach confidentiality are governed by Rules 1.6 and 1.9,
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, applied to former clients. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 05-04 (Utah St. Bar).
Corporate counsel's representation of corporate employees.

It is permissible for corporate counsel to assert that counsel concurrently represents present and former
corporate employees whose testimony is relevant to a claim and ethically preclude opposing counsel's access to
those corporate employee witnesses if corporate counsel has actually formed an attorney-client relationship with
these employee-witnesses, and has fully complied with Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 (including
obtaining informed consent from all multiple clients to joint representation and informing them of the possible need
for withdrawal from representing any of them should an actual conflict arise). However, in the absence of such a
fully formed and proper attorney-client relationship, it is improper for corporate counsel to block opposing
counsel's access to other current corporate constituents, by asserting an attorney-client relationship unless these
individuals were control group members, their acts could be imputed to the organization or their statement would
bind the corporation with respect to the matter under Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2, and, similarly, it is
improper to block opposing counsel's access to any former employee in the absence of a current fully formed and
proper attorney-client relationship. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 04-06 (Utah St. Bar).

1-',
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Disclosure of client's suicide threat.
An attorney who reasonably believes a client is contemplating imminent suicide may be free from the strict
requirement of (b )( 1) of this rule and may disclose a suicide threat to another who may help prevent it, with the
caveat that circumstances should be such as to cause a reasonably prudent attorney to deem the situation to be
exigent in nature and of sufficient gravity to require the attorney in the exercise of his professional judgment to
make such a disclosure, and the preferable recipient of such disclosure should be a Court or other authorities who
might help prevent it as opposed to family members or other third parties. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 95 (Utah
St. Bar 1994 ).

Duties when client has materially misled court.
Counsel who knows that a client has materially misled the court may not remain silent and continue to represent
the client, because to do so would be 11 assisting" the client in committing a fraud on the court. Counsel is obligated
to remonstrate with the client and attempt to persuade the client to rectify the misleading or untruthful statements
to the court, and if this is unsuccessful, counsel must seek to withdraw. If withdrawal is denied, counsel must
disclose the fraud to the court. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 00-06 (Utah St. Bar).

Information falling under reporting requirements of abuse statute.
An attorney who fails to report information obtained from a client that falls under the abuse statute in §
62A-4a-403 does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct; however, the attorney does have the discretion to
disclose such information with client consent under subsection (a) of this rule, orto the extent the attorney believes
it is necessary under subsection (b). Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 97-12 (Utah St. Bar).
When an attorney has reason to believe a person who is not a client has abused a child and the information upon
which the belief is based derives from the attorney's representation of a client, the attorney may report the
suspected abuse over the client's objection without violating the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Utah Ethics
Advisory Op. No. 95-06 (Utah St. Bar).

Information given in initial conference.
Information given to an attorney in an initial telephone conference by an individual whom the attorney has agreed
to represent is confidential, even against a request for such information by law enforcement authorities seeking to
apprehend the accused client. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 97-02 (Utah St. Bar).

Lawyer engaged for limited purpose.
In the absence of a court order to the contrary, an attorney who was hired by a client for the limited purpose of
reviewing and advising about a plea offer made by the prosecution to the client may not divulge any aspect of the
communications with the client either to the prosecution or in open court. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 05-01 (Utah
St. Bar).

Lawyer functioning in law-related profession.
A lawyer functioning in a law-related profession, such as real estate brokerage, who holds himself out as either
an active or inactive lawyer will be subject to the confidentiality requirements of this rule while engaged in that
law-related profession. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 01-05 (Utah St. Bar).

Submission of billing statements to outside audit service.
Before a lawyer may submit billing statements to an outside audit service, the lawyer must have the client's
consent, and if the lawyer is relying on an insurance agreement for consent, the lawyer must review the agreement
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with the client to renew the client's consent before sending any billing statements to the outside audit seNice. Utah
Ethics Advisory Op. No. 98-03 (Utah St. Bar).
Surreptitious recording of communications.

It is not unethical for an attorney to surreptitiously record by electronic or mechanical means communications with
clients, witnesses, or other attorneys. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 090 (Utah St. Bar 1994).
Third party's statements.
Statements made by a client's health-care provider to an attorney are confidential information as to the client and
are protected by this rule, even though the information may reveal past criminal conduct by a third party, or even
an ongoing criminal fraud scheme in which the client is not participating; the attorney is bound to the obligation of
confidentiality under this rule and may not reveal information received in the course of representing the client to
anyone, including insurance carriers or law enforcement authorities, without the client's consent. Utah Ethics
Advisory Op. No. 03-02 (Utah State Bar).
When a health-care provider treating an attorney's client made statements to the attorney regarding possible
illegal practices of the provider, the attorney could generally warn existing or future clients that they should be
·careful in analyzing their health-care provider bills for accuracy. However, absent consent from the client, the
attorney may not advise such clients that they should specifically be aware of this provider or state the reasons
they should be aware of this particular provider, because such information has been obtained in the attorney's
representation of a client, to whom the attorney owes a duty of confidentiality. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 03-02
(Utah State Bar).
Use of e-mail.
A lawyer may, in ordinary circumstances, use unencrypted Internet e-mail to transmit client confidential
information without violating the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 00-01 (Utah St.
Bar).
Utah Law Review. -- Professional Standards Versus Personal Ethics: The Lawyer's Dilemma, 1989 Utah L. Rev.

1

A.LR. -Determination of whether a communication is from a corporate client for purposes of the attorney-client privilege
-- modern cases, 26 A.LR.5th 628.
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Current through rules effective as of November 1, 2015 .
.d)

Utah Court Rules > UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION > PART II. SUPREME
COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE > CHAPTER 13. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT > CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP

Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: Current Clients.
(a)

Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:

(1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
(2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of
the lawyer.
(b)

Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may
represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent

representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client
represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

History
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-.~.,...~-~cu.;,..:--;-...:..,~~.~:.:;;;.~.;.....~:~·~

Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2005
Annotations

Notes
General Principles
[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent
conflicts of int_erest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or
from the lawyer's own interests. For specific rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8.
For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule
1.18. For definitions of "informed consent" and "confirmed in writing," see Rules 1.0(e) and (b).
[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client
or clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be
undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and, 4} if so, consult with
the clients affected under paragraph (a)(1} and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients
affected under paragraph (a}(1} include both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more
clients whose representation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).
[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be
declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b}. To
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determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the
size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non litigation matters the persons and issues
involved. See also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse
a lawyer's violation of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established,
is continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.
[4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the
representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of
paragraph (b ). See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to
represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client
and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the
former client. See Rule 1.9. See also Comments [5] and [29].
[4a] To eliminate confusion, former Rule 2.2 "Intermediary" has been deleted entirely. The term "intermediation"
is changed in Rule 1.7 to "common representation". Comment [4] sets out the analysis that a lawyer should make
in order to determine when common representation is improper. The comments to Rule 1. 7 specifically instruct
lawyers on what informed consent means in the situations.
[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the
addition or realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a
company sued by the iawyer on behaif of one ciient is bought by another ciient represented by the iawyer in an
unrelated matter. Depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the
representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take
steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the
client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).
Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse

[6] Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that
client's informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a
person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to
whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer
relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose
behalf the adverse representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case
less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the
lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is
required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the
testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous
representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation
of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and
thus may not require consent of the respective clients.
[7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent
the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in
another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the iriformed consent of each
client.
Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation
[8] Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's
ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited
as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several
individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or
advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The
conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of
subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a

G...i

G

~

~

Page 3 of 13
Utah Rules of Prof I Conduct Rule 1. 7
difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent
professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be
pursued on behalf of the client.
Lawyer's Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons
[91 In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be
materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other
persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.
Personal Interest Conflicts
[1 OJ The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.
For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or
impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning
possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such
discussions could materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow
related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the
lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific rules pertaining to a number of personal
interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under
Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law firm).
[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely
related by blood or marriage, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the
lawyer's family relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a result, each
client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the lawyer
agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or
spouse, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless
each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family relationship is personal and
ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.
[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship
predates the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j).
Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service
[13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of that
fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment
to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that
the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the
person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer
must comply with the requirements of paragraph {b) before accepting the representation, including determining
whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of
the representation.
Prohibited Representations
[14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in
paragraph (b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such
agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more
than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.
[15] Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately
protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of
interest. Thus, under paragraph (b)(1 ), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot
reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1
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(competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence).
[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by
applicable law. For example, in some states substantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent
more than one defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes
certain representations by a former government lawyer are prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former
client. In addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a governmental client, such as a municipality,
to consent to a conflict of interest.
[1-?J Paragraph {b )(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous
development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation
or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning
of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude
a lawyer's multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before
a "tribunal" under Rule 1.0{m)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b )(1 ).
Informed Consent
[18) Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the
material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict cou!d have adverse effects on the interests of that
client. See Rule 1.0(e) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the
nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the
information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty,
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and
[31] (effect of common representation on confidentiality).
[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For
example~ when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent
to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask
the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to
obtain separate representation with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the
benefits of securing separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in
determining whether common representation is in the client's interests.
Consent Confirmed in Writing
[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a
writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to
the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission).
If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must
obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not
supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any,
of representation burrlened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the
client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather,
the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to
make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.

Q

Revoking Consent
[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate
the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the
lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the
conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable
expectations of the other client and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.

Q

Consent to Future Conflict

Q
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[22] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to
the test of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the
client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation
of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse
consequences of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite
understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already
familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and
open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will
have understood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal
services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent is more
likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving consent
and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case, advance
consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict
nonconsentable under paragraph (b ).
Conflicts in Litigation
[23] Paragraph (b )(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients'
consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such
as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial
discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that
there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can
arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a
criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the
other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements
of paragraph (b) are met.
[241 Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at diffeient times on behalf of
different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent
adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of
interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one
client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example,
when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf
of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where
the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the
matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and the
clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent
informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one
or both matters.
[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit,
unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying
paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before
representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent
in a class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer
represents in an unrelated matter.
Nonlitigation Conflicts
[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion
of directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether
there is significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with
the client or clients involved~ the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will
arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See
Comment [8].
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[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be
called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the
circumstances, a conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be
unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view, the
client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer
should make clear the lawyer's relationship to the parties involved.
[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent
multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common
representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some
difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients
on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or
more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more
clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve
potentially adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to
obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation.
Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.

[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the
common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be
additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing
all of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple
representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients
where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the
lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is
improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties
has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common
representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both
parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a relationship between the
parties.
[30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on
ctient-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the
prevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be
assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications,
and the client should be so advised.
[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one
client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is
so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of
anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer
will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common
representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that
information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material
to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer
to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will
keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose
one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between
the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.
[32) When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the
lawyer1s role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be
required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any
limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be

,.....
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fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).
[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent
representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the
right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.
Organizational Clients
[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation,
necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13{a).
Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an
unrelated matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the
lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid
representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the
new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client.
[35} A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should
determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the
corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to tha frequency with which
such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board
and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is
material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer
should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise.
The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board
meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the attorney-client
privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require
the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.

Case Notes
Bankruptcy.
Disqualification.
Loyalty to client.

Bankruptcy.
When applying to serve as counsel for a bankruptcy debtor, an attorney is required to disclose fully and candidly
all relationships with the debtor, creditors, or any other party in interest in order that the court may properly evaluate
the application and determine whether the attorney is disinterested. The existence of a pre-petition debt from one
estate to another that the attorney also seeks to represent creates a disqualifying conflict of interest. In re Green
St., 132 Bankr. 460 {Bankr. D. Utah 1991 ).

Disqualification.
Although this rule was violated by an attorney's estate-planning representation of an individual who was also a
defendant in litigation being pursued by another attorney in the firm, that conduct did not amount to a need for
disqualification. Apparently, no confidential or privileged information was shared between the attorneys; therefore,
the situation did not involve the type of egregious conduct generally associated with the harsh remedy of
disqualification. Parkinson v. Phonex Corp., 857 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Utah 1994).

Loyalty to client.
When a defense attorney in a capital homicide case took a position in another homicide case directly contrary to
his client's interest by seeking to characterize the client as a "prime candidate for the death penalty," the attorney
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breached his duty of loyalty and was disqualified from further representation of the client. State v. Holland, 876 P.2d
357 (Utah 1994).
Cited in

State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992); Bullock v. Carver,
910 F. Supp. 551 (D. Utah 1995).

Research References & Practice Aids
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Appeals by Attorney General.

Ethical Advisory Opinions.
Where no conflict with other constitutional or statuto1y provisions exist, the Attorney General retains common-law
authority to protect what she perceives to be the public interest, and may appeal the decision of a division of a state
agency to the executive director of that agency, without violating the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Utah
Ethics Advisory Op. No. 95-07 (Utah St. Bar).

~

Attorney serving as member of board of directors of client corporation.

The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit an attorney from serving as a member of the board of
directors of a client corporation; however, to avoid ethical violations, an attorney who undertakes a dual role as
director and counsel for a corporate client should take adequate precautions both before and during the
relationship. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 98-10 (Utah St. Bar).
Communication of settlement offer.

It is ethical for plaintiff's lawyer to communicate to the defendant a settlement offer proposing that plaintiff take
an assignment of any bad-faith claim that the defendant might have against the insurance carrier in exchange for
plaintiff's agreement not to execute against defendant for amounts exceeding the insurance policy limits, so long
as the communication complies with Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 4.1 and 4.2, and if the offer of settlement
creates a conflict of interest for the defendant's insurance carrier-appointed lawyer, then the defendant's lawyer
must fully comply with Rule 1.7. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 00-05 (Utah St. Bar 2000).
Concurrent representation of both parties in a divorce.

The concurrent representation of both parties in a divorce is an ethically unacceptable practice that lends itself
to both the appearance and the fact of impropriety. The danger to the parties and the courts outweighs the
advantages of cost and convenience advanced as reasons for adoption of a rule allowing dual representation.
Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 116 (Utah St. Bar 1994 ).
Conflict with judge.

Where an attorney filed a complaint with the Judicial Conduct Commission against a judge, which was eventually
dismissed for insufficient evidence with no finding of misconduct, before accepting new cases as counsel and
appearing before that judge, the attorney must inform the client if the attorney thinks the judge may harbor some
ill feelings; however, if the attorney has a reasonable good-faith belief that the judge does not harbor any ill feeling,
then the attorney need not advise the client of the complaint filed against the judge. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No.
02-08 (Utah St. Bar):

r··,
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Contingent fee including costs.
There is no per se restriction prohibiting an attorney from assuming all litigation costs and expenses under a
contingency-fee agreement; such fee agreements, however, must comply with all other applicable provisions of
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct concerning fees. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 02-09 (Utah St. Bar).

Corporate counsel's representation of corporate employees.
It is permissible for corporate counsel to assert that counsel concurrently represents present and former
corporate employees whose testimony is relevant to a claim and ethically preclude opposing counsel's access to
those corporate employee witnesses if corporate counsel has actually formed an attorney-client relationship with
these employee-witnesses, and has fully complied with Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1. 7 (including
obtaining informed consent from all multiple clients to joint representation and informing them of the possible need
for withdrawal from representing any of them should an actual conflict arise). However, in the absence of such a
fully formed and proper attorney-client relationship, it is improper for corporate counsel to block opposing
counsel's access to other current corporate constituents, by asserting an attorney-client relationship unless these
individuals were control group members, their acts could be imputed to the organization or their statement would
bind the corporation with respect to the matter under Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2, and, similarly, it is
improper to block opposing counsel's access to any former employee in the absence of a current fully formed and
proper attorney-client relationship. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 04-06 (Utah St. Bar).

County and city attorneys.
An attorney who serves as a part-time county attorney or part-time deputy county attorney is ethically barred from
appearing as counsel on behalf of a defendant in a civil action brought in the county by the State of Utah to collect
delinquent child support payments under§§ 62A-11-104, 77 -31-12 and 78-45-9. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 099
(Utah St. Bar 1994 ).
The private representation by a part-time county attorney of individuals at protective-order hearings is not a per
se violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. However, the county attorney must fully inform the client
that he will not be able to continue the representation if the client later becomes a criminal defendant in his county
and that he will have to withdraw as counsel. The county attorney must also determine, on a case-by-case basis,
the likelihood that this potential conflict of interest between his prosecutorial duties and the interest of his private
client will actually arise and, if the likelihood that this will occur is relatively high, the attorney must obtain both the
county's and the client's informed consent to the representation. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 01-06A (Utah St.
Bar).
Where a county attorney undertakes the representation of a petitioner, rather than a respondent, in a
protective-order proceeding, and the issue arises as to whether the county attorney could participate as a
prosecutor in a criminal proceeding eventually instituted against the object of the protective order, given (a) the risk
that the neutrality that characterizes a prosecutor's role could be compromised by the interest that the prosecutor
and his private client have in the case, {b) the confidential information regarding the pending charges to which the
county attorney would be privy as a result of his representation of the victim of the alleged abuse, and (c) the
possibility an actual conflict between the interests of the victim and the prosecuting authority, it would be unethical
for the county attorney to continue in the protective-order case or to participate in the criminal proceeding. Utah
Ethics Advisory Op. No. 01-06A (Utah St. Bar).
An individual county attorney may provide pro bono legal assistance to victims of domestic violence in seeking
civil protective orders. However, after the county attorney has done so, he may not be involved in the prosecution
of the perpetrator for the initial act or for a subsequent violation of the protective order. And he may continue the
pro bono representation only if he is fully able to comply with Rule 1.7(a) where his personal interest in his paid
work for the county does not create a material limitation. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 06-01 (Utah St. Bar).
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A part-time county attorney providing pro bono legal assistance to a victim of domestic violence must, at the
outset, fully inform the client of potential conflicts and the need to withdraw if actual conflicts arise. Moreover, if the
possibility of a conflict is likely and if that possibility will materially interfere with the lawyer's representation, the
lawyer should not undertake the case initially. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 06-01 (Utah St. Bar).
It could be possible for a county attorney's office to organize itself in such a way as to ethically provide
representation for individual client victims in civil cohabitant abuse actions and then later permit a separate division
or attorney in the office to represent the state in any related criminal prosecution. However, any such organization
would have to prohibit any confidential information from flowing from one sector to the other. Utah Ethics Advisory
Op. No. 06-01 (Utah St. Bar).

Q

~

Financial interest in a collection agency.

Subject to any legal constraints imposed by former Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-27(1 ), it is not per se unethical for
an attorney who has a financial interest in a collection agency to represent the agency in lawsuits to collect on
assigned accounts. (Reversing Opinion No. 45.) Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 111 (Utah St. Bar 1994).

~

Firm's acquisition of finandal interest in client.
A law firm's acquisition of a financial interest such as stock ownership in a client, whether the investment is made
directly by the law firm or through a blind trust, holding company, investment partnership or other investment
vehicle, and whether the interest is acquired in exchange for legal services or whether the client's primary attorney
is involved in investment decisions concerning the client's stock, is not per se unethical. However, in all such
arrangements, counsel must comply with the requirements of Rules 1.5, 1.7(b) and 1.B(a) of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 98-13 (Utah St. Bar).
Guardianships.

Representation of guardian by an attorney who also represented one of the parties to the proceeding for
appointment of the guardian must be analyzed the same way the attorney would analyze any conflict of interest
between two current clients or between a current and former client. If the facts and circumstances raise the specter
of a direct or material adversity, or if responsibilities to the client impose a material limitation on the attorney's ability
to represent the guardian effectively in light of the fiduciary, statutory, and court-imposed obligations on the
guardianship, the attorney should either avoid the joint representation or exercise great care in obtaining the
informed written consent of both affected clients. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 08-02 (Utah State Bar).
Investigation of office of Attorney General.

Neither the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, generally, nor Rules 1.11 (c) and 1.7(b), specifically, prohibit the
proposed investigation of the Office of the Attorney General, to determine whether any Utah criminal laws were
violated by the Salt Lake City Bid Committee for the Olympic Winter Games, despite the Attorney General's prior
involvement with the Bid Committee. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 99-05 (Utah St. Bar).
Lawyer as insurance appraiser.

The Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the conduct of a lawyer who has been appointed by an
insurance company as an "independent" appraiser of the property of an insured of the company, even though the
lawyer also provides legal services for the insurance company on unrelated matters, so long as the lawyer makes
a written disclosure to the insurance company and to the insured (1) that the lawyer represents the insurance
company on unrelated matters; (2) that the lawyer's retention by the insurance company as an "independent"
appraiser is not a retention to perform legal services; and (3) that the retention does not create a client-lawyer
relationship governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct and is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 151 (Utah St. Bar 1994).

Q
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Lawyer as witness.
There is no per se disqualification of a lawyer in a case where she may be called as a witness. The lawyer must
determine whether, under the facts of the case, she is a "necessary witness" in the litigation under Rule 3. 7. If she
is, and if disqualification of the lawyer would not work a substantial hardship on the client, she must withdraw prior
to trial. If the lawyer does not withdraw, the lawyer must insure that the client's interests are and can be protected
in a timely manner. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 04-02 (Utah State Bar).
Lawyer functioning in law-related profession.
A lawyer functioning in a law-related profession, such as real estate brokerage, who holds himself out as either
an active or inactive lawyer will be subject to the conflict-of-interest provisions of Rules 1.7 through 1.11 while
engaged in that law-related profession. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 01-05 (Utah St. Bar).
Loans.
A lawyer may not directly or indirectly represent a lender to the lawyer's client in connection with a loan that is
made for the purpose of enabling the client t? pay the lawyer's fees or costs. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 06-03.
A lawyer may not participate in a contingent, nonrecourse loan with a third-party lender to finance costs and
expenses of litigation where the terms of the lending arrangement create the potential that the financial risk to the
lawyer is lessened if the lawyer obtains no recovery for the client. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 06-03.
Providing non-legal services to law clients.
It is permissible for a lawyer to refer a client to a cooperative organization created by the lawyer to provide
non-legal services, and for the lawyer to participate in the organization's profit sharing, if the lawyer: (1) objectively
concludes that any identifiable conflicts between the lawyer and the cooperative organization would not materially
affect the representation of that client; (2) affirms in writing to the client that the referral will not compromise the
client's interests in any way; (3) fairly concludes that the services provided by the cooperative organization are
being provided at fair and reasonable fees; (4) discloses that the lawyer will receive a share of profits from the
cooperative organization; (5) advises the client to seek independent counsel as to the referral; and (6) secures the
client's consent. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 04-05 (Utah State Bar).
Relationship with client.
Defense counsel in a criminal case continued to zealously represent their client, despite his complaints and
apparent efforts at intimidation, so that their uneasy relationship did not result in a conflict for the attorneys. State
v. Martinez, 2013 UT App 39, 297 P.3d 653.
Representation by attorney guardian ad litem of interests of siblings.
The same attorney guardian ad litem may represent the interests of siblings in, for example, abuse/neglect
cases, where the interests of the siblings are not directly adverse, the representation of one sibling will not
materially limit the lawyer's responsibilities to another sibling or adversely affect the lawyer's representation of
another sibling, and it is not reasonably foreseeable that the lawyer will obtain confidential information relating to
the representation of one sibling that might be used to the disadvantage of another sibling represented by the
lawyer. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 95-08 (Utah St. Bar).
Representation by attorney guardian of siblings of represented child.
If the same attorney guardian may not represent siblings of a represented child, other attorney guardians within
the same office may not represent the siblings, however, attorney guardians in other offices may represent siblings
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of a represented child, if they have no opportunity to discuss the cases with each other, to access each other's files,
or to share confidential information in other respects, and they are not subject to common direction, planning, or
supervision with respect to the conduct of the case. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 95-08 (Utah St. Bar).

~

Representation in district in which law partner is judge.
A lawyer may represent criminal defendants in the same judicial district in which a law partner sits as a justice
court judge; however, the lawyer may not appear before that partner. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 95-02A (Utah
St. Bar).
A city attorney with prosecutorial functions may not represent a criminal defense client in any jurisdiction.
However, a city attorney with no prosecutorial functions, who has been appointed as city attorney pursuant to
statute, may represent a criminal defense client in other jurisdictions, provided that subsection (a) of this rule is
satisfied. An attorney with no prosecutorial functions, who is retained by a city on a contract or retainer basis, may
represent a criminal defense client in any jurisdiction, provided that subsection (a). of this rule is satisfied. An
attorney who is a partner or associate of a city attorney may not represent a criminal defense client in any situation
w_here the city attorney is so prohibited. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 126 (Utah St. Bar 1994 ).
A part-time or contract city attorney with prosecutorial functions is not disqualified under this rule or Opinion No.
1_ 26 from representing a private client who is a defendant in a civil contempt proceeding, provided the city is not a
party to the proceeding. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 95-03 (Utah St. Bar).

Representation of absent party.
In action against employer and a vanished former employee, which arose when the missing person was an
employee, the employer's lawyer may not act on behalf of or purport to represent the vanished former employee
unless the lawyer has an existing attorney-client relationship with the former employee or the former employee
agreed to the representation before vanishing and, in either case, the lawyer complies with Rules 1.7 and 1.8(f).
The lawyer may engage in acts that may benefit the vanished former employee provided the lawyer makes it clear
that he is acting on behalf of the employer as the employer's lawyer and not on behalf of the vanished former
employee as the former employee's lawyer. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 04-01A (Utah State Bar).

Representation of association.
For discussion of conflicts that might arise in representation of homeowners associations with regard to the
associations' managers, see, Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 09-02 (Utah St. Bar).

Representation of both city and county on civil matters.
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct do not require a blanket prohibition of an attorney's representation of
both a city and county on civil matters; however, in the event the two entities are directly in conflict as to a particular
matter, the attorney may not represent both (and perhaps neither) of the parties in that matter or other matters,
unless the attorney can comply with the provisions of Subdivision (a) of this rule. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No.
98-02 (Utah St. Bar).

Representation of both parents in abuse/neglect proceeding.
An attorney appointed to represent both the mother and father in an abuse/neglect proceeding can not continue
to represent either of the parents after an actual or potential conflict between the two parents arises, because such
representation of either parent is prohibited by Rule 1.7 and Rul~ 1.9. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 96-11 (Utah
St. Bar).

Retainer agreement in action against county.
In a lawsuit against a Utah county, brought by the heirs of a decedent whose medical bills were paid, in part, by
the State of Utah's Medicaid program after the decedent had been in the county's jail facility, the attorney

~

~

~
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representing the Office of Recovery Services may request the heirs and their attorney to execute a retainer
agreement that precludes the heirs' attorney from acting adversely to ORS and provides that ORS will be paid first
from any recovery from third parties as a condition for ORS's contributing to the heirs' attc,rneys' fees and costs.
Whether the heirs' attorney may execute such a retainer agreement depends on whether the attorney can satisfy
the conflict-of-interest requirements of Rule 1.7(b). Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 98-11 (Utah St. Bar).
Settlements.
An attorney representing a plaintiff in a personal injury action may not, under Rule 1.7(a), agree to indemnify an
opposing party from claims by third persons to settlement funds. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 11-01 (Utah St.
Bar).
Submission of billing statements to outside audit service.
Before a lawyer may submit billing statements to an outside audit service, the lawyer must have the client's
consent, and if the lawyer is relying on an insurance agreement for consent, the lawyer must review the agreement
with the client to renew the client's consent before sending any billing statements to the outside audit service. Utah
Ethics Advisory Op. No. 98-03 (Utah St. Bar).
Taking referral fee not per se unethical.
It is not per se unethical for a lawyer to refer a client to an investment advisor and take a referral fee from the
commission paid to that advisor, although the lawyer has a heavy burden to insure compliance with applicable
ethical rules. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 99-07 (Utah St. Bar).
A Utah prosecuting attorney acting as a private practitioner should avoid engaging in a civil action that involves
parties and facts that have been or become the subject of criminal investigation within the prosecutor's jurisdiction.
The attorney already involved in civil litigation need not withdraw from the civil matter and can avoid inherent
conflicts by referring the criminal matter to an appropriate conflicts attorney, provided the attorney has not become
personally substantially involved in and has no meaningful control over any investigation of the criminal matter.
Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 98-01 (Utah St. Bar}.
Utah Law Review. -- Recent Developments in Utah Case Law: Examining Ethical Responsibilities of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 287.
Journal of Contemporary Law.
Where Does the Tenth Circuit Stand on Rules Concerning Conflict of Interest and Disqualification Rules?, 20 J.
Contemp. L. 479 (1994)

A.LR. -Attorneys at law: disciplinary proceedings for drafting instrument such as will or trust under which attorney-drafter
or member of attorney's family or law firm is beneficiary, grantee, legatee, or devisee, 80 A.LR.5th 597.
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· Utah Rules of Profl Conduct Rule 1.8
Current through rules effective as of November 1, 2015.

Utah Court Rules > UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION > PART II. SUPREME
COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTJCE > CHAPTER 13. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT > CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP

Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules.
{a)

A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership,
possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the trans~ction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client

and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the
client;

G

(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to

seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the
transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the
client in the transaction.

(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client
unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.

(c) AJawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift or prepare on behalf
of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the
lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the client. For purpose of this paragraph, related persons
include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual with whom the lawyer
or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.

{d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement
giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or an account based in substantial part on
information relating to the representation.
(e)

A lawyer sha!I not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated
litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be

contingent on the outcome of the matter; and

Q

(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation, and minor
expenses reasonably connected to the litigation, on behalf of the client.

(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client gives informed consent;

(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the
client-lawyer relationship; and
{3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.

{g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the
claims of or against the clients or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo
contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in writing signed by the client. The lawyer's
disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation
of each person in the settlement.

Q
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(h) A lawyer shall not:
(1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless the
client is independently represented in making the agreement; or

(2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client unless that
person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek
the advice of independent legal counsel in connection therewith.

(i)

A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the
lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.

{j)

A lawyer shall not engage in sexual relations with a client that exploit the lawyer-client relationship. For the
purposes of this Rule:

(1) "sexual relations" means sexual intercourse or the touching of an intimate part of another person for
the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse; and
(2) except for a spousal relationship or a sexual relationship that existed at the commencement of the
lawyer-client relationship, sexual relations between the lawyer and the client shall be presumed to be
exploitive. This presumption is rebuttable.

(k) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in the foregoing paragraphs (a) through (i) that applies
to any one of them shall apply to all of them.

History
1
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Amended effective November 1, 2005
Annotations

Notes
Business Transactions Between Client and Lawyer
[1] A lawyer•s legal skill and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and
client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business, property or financial
transaction with a client, for example, a loan or sales transaction or a lawyer investment on behalf of a client. The
requirements of paragraph (a) must be met even when the transaction is not closely related to the subject matter
of the representation, as when a lawyer drafting a will for a client learns that the client needs money for unrelated
expenses and offers to make a loan to the client. The Rule applies to lawyers engaged in the sale of goods or
services related to the practice of law, for example, the sale of title insurance or investment services to existing
clients of the lawyer's legal practice. See Rule 5. 7. It also applies to lawyers purchasing property from estates they
represent. It does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule
1.5, although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business or other
nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee. In addition, the Rule does not apply to standard
commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally
markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or
distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with
the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable.
[2] Paragraph (a)(1} requires that the transaction itself be fair to the client and that its essential terms be
communicated to the client, in writing, in a manner that can be reasonably understood. Paragraph (a}(2) requires
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that the client also be advised, in writing, of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel. It
also requires that the ~lient be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice. Paragraph (a)(3) requires that
the lawyer obtain the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, both to the essential terms of the
transaction and to tha lawyer's role. When necessary, the lawyer should discuss both the material risks of the
proposed transaction, including any risk presented by the lawyer's involvement, and the existence of reasonably
available alternatives and should explain why the advice of independent legal counsel is desirable. See Rule
1.0(e) (definition of informed consent).
[3] The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the client in the transaction itself
or when the lawyer's financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the
client will be materially limited by the lawyer's financial interest in the transaction. Here the lawyer's role requires
that the lawyer must comply, not only with the requirements of paragraph (a), but also with the requirements of Rule
1 .7. Under that Rule, the lawyer must disclose the risks associated with the lawyer's dual role as both legal adviser
and participant in the transaction, such as the risk that the lawyer will structure the transaction or give legal advice
in a way that favors the lawyer's interests at the expense of the client. Moreover, the lawyer must obtain the client's
informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer's interest may be such that Rule 1.7 will preclude the lawyer from
seeking the client's consent to the transaction.
[4] If the client is independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule is inapplicable, and
ihe paragraph (a)('i) requiremeni for fuii disclosure is sarisfied either by a writren disciosure by rhe lawyer invoived
in the transaction or by the client's independent counsel. The fact that the client was independently represented in
the transaction is relevant in determining whether the agreement was fair and reasonable to the client as
paragraph (a)(1) further requires.
Use of Information R8Iated to Representation

[SJ Use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client violates the lawyer's duty of
loyalty. Paragraph (b) applies when the information is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as
another client or business associate of the lawyer. For example, if a lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase
and develop several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase one of the parcels in
competition with the client or to recommend that another client make such a purchase. The Rule does not prohibit
uses that do not disadvantage the client. For example, a lawyer who learns a government agency's interpretation
of trade legislation during the representation of one client may properly use that information to benefit other clients.
Paragraph (b) prohibits disadvantageous use of client information unless the client gives informed consent, except
as permitted or required by these Rules. See Rules 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.9(c), 3.3, 4.1 (b ), 8.1 and 8.3.
Gifts to Lawyers
[6] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example,
a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If a client offers the
lawyer a more substantial gift, paragraph (c) does not prohibit the lawyer from accepting it, although such a gift
may be voidable by the client under the doctrine of undue influence, which treats client gifts as presumptively
fraudulent. In any event, due to concerns about overreaching and imposition on clients, a lawyer may not suggest
that a substantial gift be made to the lawyer or for the lawyer's benefit, except where the lawyer is related to the
client as set forth in paragraph (c).
[7] If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance the client
should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. The sole exception to this Rule is where the
client is a relative of the donee.
[8] This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer
named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such
appointments will be subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1. 7 when there is a significant risk
that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment will materially limit the lawyer's independent professional
judgment in advising the client concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client's
informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the
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lawyer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the position.
Literary Rights
[9] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation
creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in
the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation.
Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from
agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to
Rule 1.5.
Financial Assistance
[1 O] Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients,
including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage
clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too
great a financial stake in the litigation. These dangers do not warrant a prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court
costs and litigation expenses, including the expenses of medical examination and the costs of obtaining and
presenting evidence, because these advances are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fees and help ensure
access to the courts. Similarly, an exception allowing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court costs and
litigation expenses and minor sums reasonably connected to the litigation, such as the cost of maintaining nominal
basic local telephone service or providing bus passes to enable the indigent client to have means of contact with
the lawyer during litigation, regardless of whether these funds will be repaid, is warranted.
[10a] Relative to theABAModel Rule, Utah Rule 1.8(e)(2) broadens the scope of direct support that a lawyer may
provide to indigent clients to cover minor expenses reasonably connected to the litigation. This would include, for
example, financial assistance in providing transportation, communications or lodging that would be required or
desirable to assist the indigent client in the course of the litigation.
Person Paying for a Lawyer's Services
[11] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will
compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as
a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees).
Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in
minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers
are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be
no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client.
See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends,
employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another).
[12] Sometimes, it will be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the client's informed consent regarding the fact of the
payment and the identity of the third-party payer. If, however, the fee arrangement creates a conflict of interest for
the lawyer, then the lawyer must comply with Rule. 1.7. The lawyer must also conform to the requirements of Rule
1.6 concerning confidentiality. Under Rule 1.7(a), a conflict of interest exists if there is significant risk that the
lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in the fee arrangement
or by the lawyer's responsibilities to the third-party payer (for example, when the third-party payer is a co-client).
Under Rule 1.7(b), the lawyer may accept or continue the representation with the informed consent of each
affected client, unless the conflict is nonconsentable under that paragraph. Under Rule 1.7(b), the informed
consent must be confirmed in writing.
Aggregate Settlements
[13] Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks of common
representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1. 7, this is one of the risks that should be
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discussed before undertaking the representation, as part of the process of obtaining the clients' informed consent.
In addition, Rule 1.2(a) protects each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an
offer of settlement and in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a criminal case. The rule
stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these Rules and provides that, before any settlement offer or plea
bargain is made or accepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the
material terms of the settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer
is accepted. See also Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent). Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or
defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relationship with each member of
the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class members
and other procedural requirements designed to ensure adequate protection of the entire class.

~
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Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims
[14] Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability for malpractice are prohibited unless the client is
independently represented in making the agreement because they are likely to undermine competent and diligent
representation. Also, many clients are unable to evaluate the desirability of making such an agreement before a
dispute has arisen, particularly if they are then represented by the lawyer seeking the agreement. This paragraph

~

claims, provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of the
agreement. Nor does this paragraph limit the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of a limited-liability entity,
· where permitted by law, provided that each lawyer remains personally liable to the client for his or her own conduct
and the firm complies with any conditions required by law, such as provisions requiring client notification or
maintenance of adequate liability insurance. Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accordance with Rule 1.2 that
defines the scope of the representation, although a definition of scope that makes the obligations of representation
illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.
[15] Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not prohibited by this Rule. Nevertheless,
in view of the danger that a lawyer will take unfair advantage of an unrepresented client or former client, the lawyer
must first advise such a person in writing of the appropriateness of independent representation in connection with
such a settlement. In addition, the lawyer must give the client or former client a reasonable opportunity to find and
consult independent counsel.
Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Litigation
[16] Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary
interest in litigation. Like paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance
and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition, when the lawyer
acquires an ownership interest in the subject of the representation, it will be more difficult for a client to discharge
the lawyer if the client so desires. The Rule is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and
continued in these Rules. The exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation is set forth in paragraph (e ).
In addition, paragraph (i) sets forth exceptions for liens authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses
and contracts for reasonable contingent fees. The law of each jurisdiction determines which liens are authorized
by law. These may include liens granted by statute, liens originating in common law and liens acquired by contract
with the client. When a lawyer acquires by contract a security interest in property other than that recovered through
the lawyer's efforts in the litigation, such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction with a client and is
governed by the requirements of paragraph (a). Contracts for contingent fees in civil cases are governed by Rule

1.5.
Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships
[17} The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the highest
position of trust and confidence. The relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between
lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer's basic
r···,
\j:.jJ
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ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client's disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship
presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer's emotional involvement, the lawyer will be unable to
represent the client without impairment of the exercise of independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred
line between the professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict to what extent client
confidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, since client confidences are protected by
privilege only when they are imparted in the context of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the significant
danger of harm to client interests and because the client's own emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the
client could give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual relations with a
client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.
[18] Spousal relationships and sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not prohibited.
Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship and client dependency are diminished when the
sexual relationship existed prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer relationship. However, before
proceeding with the representation in these circumstances, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer's ability
to represent the client will be materially limited by the relationship. See Rule 1.7(a)(2).
[19] When the client is an organization, paragraph 0) of this Rule prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether
inside counsel or outside counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a constituent of the organization who
supervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization's legal matters.
[19a] Utah Rule 1.80) is different from the ABA Model Rule. It follows the language from former Utah Rule 8.4(g)
regarding the prohibition of sexual relations with a client. This Rule defines "sexual relations" and clarifies the
presumption that sexual relations with a client are exploitive of the client.
Imputation of Prohibitions
[20] Under paragraph (k), a prohibition on conduct by an individual lawyer in paragraphs (a) through (i) also
applies to all lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. For example, one lawyer in a firm
may not enter into a business transaction with a client of another member of the firm without complying with
paragraph (a), even if the first lawyer is not personally involved in the representation of the client. The prohibition
set forth in paragraph G) is personal and is not applied to associated lawyers.

Case Notes
Financial interest in client.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Agreement to name judgment-creditor as beneficiary of insurance policy.
Ethical Advisory Opinions.
Contingent fee including costs.
Enforcement of fee agreement.
Financial interest in client.
Gifts to indigent clients.
Insurer's employment of lawyer to defend litigation.
Loans.
Payment for legal services in form other than money.
Providing non-legal services to law clients.
Representation of absent party.
Settlements.
Submission of billing statements to outside audit service.
Taking referral fee not per se unethical.
Financial interest in client.
Law firm's former oil and gas client had waived a conflict of interest by the firm because of its representation of
and investment in another exploration company and the client was thus estopped from filing suit. The disclosure
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was adequate to provide full knowledge of the rights being waived and the waiver was further evidenced by the

<;li~nt's declining to enter into a joint venture with the other company and the client also continued to use the law
firm. Shaw Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App 313, 142 P.3d 560.

'-,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Agreement to name judgment-creditor as beneficiary of insurance policy.
Ethical Advisory Opinions.
With proper written disclosure by the attorney of the terms, conditions and obligations of the participants, there are
no ethical considerations for a judgment-creditor's attorney where the judgment-debtor agrees to name the
judgment-creditor as the beneficiary of an insurance policy on the life of the judgment-debtor in order to satisfy the
judgment. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 135 (Utah St. Bar 1994 ).
Contingent fee including costs.

There :s :-:o per se :es!ricfrJ!: pr()hibit!r.g an 2tt()rney fr()m 2ss!..lmir.g a!! !itlg2t!on ccsts 2r.d expenses !..!!"!der 2
contingency-fee agreement; such fee agreements, however, must comply with all other applicable provisions of
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct concerning fees. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 02-09 (Utah St. Bar).

G

Enforcement of fee agreement.
A lawyer does not violate Rule 1.8(a) by entering into a fee agreement with a client and subsequently enforcing
that agreement by asserting a claim under former§ 78-51-41. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 01-01 (Utah St. Bar).
Financial interest in client.
A law firm's acquisition of a financial interest such as stock ownership in a client, whether the investment is made
directly by the law firm or through a blind trust, holding company, investment partnership or other investment
vehicle, and whether the interest is acquired in exchange for legal services or whether the client's primary attorney
is involved in investment decisions concerning the client's stock, is not per se unethical. However, in all such
arrangements, counsel must comply with the requirements of Rules 1.5, 1.7(b) and 1.8(a) of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 98-13 (Utah St. Bar).
Gifts to indigent clients.
Small and occasional charitable gifts by attorneys who are not seeking reimbursement and which would not
influence the client to retain or remain with that attorney do not violate this rule. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 11-02
(Utah St. Bar).
Insurer's employment of lawyer to defend litigation.
An insured must consent to an insurer's paying a lawyer employed to defend litigation brought by a third party
against an insured. For purposes of Subdivision (f), the insured manifests this consent by entering into the
insurance contract and accepting the representation offered; no new or separate consent is necessary. Utah
Ethics Advisory Op. No. 02-03 (Utah St. Bar).
Subdivision (f)(2), which requires that a lawyer accepting compensation for representing a client from one other
than that client assure that "there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or
with the client-lawyer relationship," applies to a lawyer employed to defend litigation brought by a third party
against an insured, whether or not the insurer is also a client. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 02-03 (Utah St. Bar).

Q
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Loans.
A lawyer may not directly or indirectly represent a lender to the lawyer's client in connection with a loan that is
made for the purpose of enabling the client to pay the lawyer's fees or costs. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 06-03.

Payment for legal services in form other than money.
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct permit an attorney to accept payment for legal services in a form other
than money; however all arrangements for payment of an attorney's fees must comply with the applicable
provisions of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct concerning fees and the attorney-client relationship. Utah
Ethics Advisory Op. No. 97-05 (Utah St. Bar).

Providing non-legal services to law clients.
It is permissible for a lawyer to refer a client to a cooperative organization created by the lawyer to provide
non-legal services, and for the lawyer to participate in the organization's profit sharing, if the lawyer: ( 1) objectively
concludes that any identifiable conflicts between the lawyer and the cooperative organization would not materially
affect the representation of that client; (2) affirms in writing to the client that the referral will not compromise the
client's interests in any way; (3) fairly concludes that the services provided by the cooperative organization are
being provided at fair and reasonable fees; (4) discloses that the lawyer will receive a share of profits from the
cooperative organization; (5) advises the client to seek independent counsel as to the referral; and (6) secures the
client's consent. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 04-05 (Utah State Bar).

Representation of absent party.
In action against employer and a vanished former employee, which arose when the missing person was an
employee, the employer's lawyer may not act on behalf of or purport to represent the vanished former employee
unless the lawyer has an existing attorney-client relationship with the former employee or the former employee
agreed to the representation before vanishing and, in either case, the lawyer complies with Rules 1. 7 and 1.B(f).
The lawyer may engage in acts that may benefit the vanished former employee provided the lawyer makes it clear
that he is acting on behalf of the employer as the employer's lawyer and not on behalf of the vanished former
employee as the former employee's lawyer. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 04-01A (Utah State Bar).

Settlements.
An attorney representing a plaintiff in a personal injury action may not, under Rule 1.(e), agree to indemnify an
opposing party from claims by third persons to settlement funds. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 11-01 (Utah St.
Bar).

Submission of billing statements to outside audit service.
Before a lawyer may submit billing statements to an outside audit service, the lawyer must have the client's
consent, and if the lawyer is relying on an insurance agreement for consent, the lawyer must review the agreement
with the client to renew the client's consent before sending any billing statements to the outside audit service. Utah
Ethics Advisory Op. No. 98-03 (Utah St. Bar).

Taking referral fee not per se unethical.
It is not per se unethical for a lawyer to refer a client to an investment advisor and take a referral fee from the
commission paid to that advisor, although the lawyer has a heavy burden to insure compliance with applicable
ethical rules. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 99-07 (Utah St. Bar).

Research References & Practice Aids
A.LR. -Attorney's assertion of retaining lien as violation of ethical code or rules governing professional conduct, 69
A.LR.4th 974.
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What items of client's property or funds are not subject to attorney's retaining lien, 70 A.LR.4th 827.
Disciplinary action against attorney taking loan from client, 9 A.LR.5th 193.
Attorneys at law: disciplinary proceedings for drafting instrument such as will or trust under which attorney-drafter
or member of attorney's family or law firm is beneficiary, grantee, legatee, or devisee, 80 A.LR.5th 597.
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
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